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Sentence processinga b s t r a c t
Cognitive linguists suggest that understanding metaphors requires activation of conceptual mappings
between the involved concepts. We tested whether mappings are indeed in use during metaphor com-
prehension, and what mapping means as a cognitive process with Event-Related Potentials. Participants
read literal, conventional metaphorical, novel metaphorical, and anomalous target sentences preceded by
primes with related or unrelated mappings. Experiment 1 used sentence-primes to activate related map-
pings, and Experiment 2 used simile-primes to induce comparison thinking. In the unprimed conditions
of both experiments, metaphors elicited N400s more negative than the literals. In Experiment 1, related
sentence-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in conventional, but not in novel meta-
phors. In Experiment 2, related simile-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in novel,
but not clearly in conventional metaphors. We suggest that mapping as a process occurs in metaphors,
and the ways in which it can be facilitated by comparison differ between conventional and novel
metaphors.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff,
1993, 2009) suggests that common expressions such as ‘‘As we tra-
vel down life’s path. . .’’ are metaphorical, and that understanding
them requires knowledge about the source concept of LIFE, the tar-
get concept of JOURNEY, and a set of ontological correspondences
between LIFE and JOURNEY. According to this view, the ontological
correspondences, i.e., conceptual mappings, are productive and
systematic. For example, when the person leading a life is under-
stood as a traveler, difficulties are understood as impediments to
travel (e.g., He has a rocky road ahead of him), and major choices,
crossroads (e.g., He’s at a crossroads in his life). The Neural Theory
of Metaphor (Lakoff, 2009) further suggests that mappings, at least
the conventionalized ones, are stored representations as fixed neu-
ral circuits in the brain. Thus, just as an activated circuit can acti-
vate other related circuits, an activated mapping can activate
other related mappings. Novel metaphors, however, do not have
mapping representations. Deriving interpretations for a novel met-aphor involves new binding and other connecting circuitries over
prior knowledge.
The first goal of the present paper is to investigate whethermap-
pings are indeed in use during the comprehension of conventional
and novelmetaphorical expressions.Many researchers are skeptical
about the necessity ofmappings in conventionalmetaphors. Keysar,
Shen, Glucksberg, and Horton (2000) proposed that conventional
expressions (e.g., he is depressed) can be understooddirectlywithout
recourse to underlying mappings such as SAD IS DOWN. Mappings
may be useful, though, when it comes to interpreting novel expres-
sions (e.g., I’m feeling lower than a piece of gum stuck on the bottom of
your boots). Many behavioral studies have tested this proposal (All-
britton, McKoon, & Gerrig, 1995; Gentner & Boronat, 1992; Glucks-
berg, Brown, & McGlone, 1993; Keysar et al., 2000; Thibodeau &
Durgin, 2008). The majority of these studies employed a paradigm
in which an ambiguous target sentence, ambiguous between meta-
phorical and literal readings (e.g., Tina is currently weaning her latest
child), was preceded by contexts with conventional/novel/literal
mappings (e.g., She is a prolific/fertile/dedicated researcher, conceiv-
ing/giving birth to/initiating an enormous number of new findings). In
general all studies found that the target sentences were facilitated
when preceded by novel mappings relative to controls, but not all
studies found that the target sentences were facilitated when pre-
cededby conventionalmappings. These results are hard to interpret,
because although these studies aimed at showing whether
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sions, they showed that mappings are (or are not) used for facilitat-
ing the reading times of the ambiguous target sentences.
Support for the use of mappings in conventional metaphors pri-
marily comes from studies examining specific metaphor content.
Using the conventionalized TIME IS MOTION metaphor, Gentner,
Imai, and Boroditsky (2002) found that switching from one sub-
type of time metaphor to another results in longer reaction times
as compared to keeping the same subtype. This so-called cost of
re-mapping indirectly supports the online use of mapping. Using
action-related metaphors (e.g., grasping ideas), several imaging
studies found activation in the motor and premotor cortices (Bou-
lenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Saygin, McCullough, Alac, &
Emmorey, 2010; Cacciari et al., 2011; Desai, Binder, Conant, Mano,
& Seidenberg, 2011; Desai, Conant, Binder, Park, & Seidenberg,
2013). Likewise, textual metaphors (e.g., a rough day) showed en-
hanced activation in the texture-selective somatosensory cortex
in the parietal operculum (Lacey, Stilla, & Sathian, 2012). These
data indicate that the theorized source concepts (MOTION, AC-
TION, TACTILE) may be indeed used to reason about the abstract
target concepts online, indirectly supporting mapping. While
examining specific metaphor content allows a clear prediction of
a localized brain region, it is unclear if this generalizes to meta-
phors in general. The present study expanded the scope and tested
a variety of metaphor examples.
The second goal of the research is to investigate the possibility
that conventional and novel metaphors utilize distinct mapping
processes. This question calls for further clarification of what map-
ping means as a cognitive process. In the metaphor literature, the
Career of Metaphor model (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner &
Wolff, 1997) views mapping not as a representation, but as a pro-
cess of comparison. This process entails at least a first stage of align-
ing the representations of the source and the target concepts and a
second stage of projecting inferences from the source to the target.
According to this model, all metaphors started out novel. During
novel metaphor comprehension, people compared the literal read-
ings of the source and the target concepts. Through repeated com-
parison, a metaphorical reading of the source concept becomes
conventionalized as an extended meaning of the source concept.
Thus, during conventional metaphor comprehension, people may
be comparing the target concept with (a) the literal reading of the
source concept, (b) the metaphorical reading of the source concept,
or (c) both. The comparison-based theories have been severely crit-
icized by categorization-based metaphor theorists. The Attributive
Categorization model (Glucksberg & Haught, 2006; Glucksberg &
Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997) suggests
that the notion of mapping is unnecessary and ‘‘the comparison
theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed’’ (Glucksberg &
Haught, 2006, p. 360). Metaphors do not need to be understood
via comparison, but are understood directly via ‘‘categorization’’,
i.e., categorizing the target concept (e.g., lawyer) under an ad hoc
category derived from the source concept on the spot (e.g., shark
as the category name for tenacious and vicious human beings). In
response to the criticisms, Gentner and colleagues suggested that
comparison and categorization are not far different from each
other, both requiring the basic mechanisms of structural alignment
and inference importation. The two processes do differ, though, in
terms of the kind of structural alignment and the extent of infer-
ence projection. During comparison, the literal reading of the
source concept is aligned with the target concept, and not all that
is true of the source is true in the target. During categorization
(for metaphors), the metaphorical source concept is aligned with
the target, and all that is true of the source is true in the target.
To test this, Bowdle andGentner (2005) carriedout a studywhere
subjectswere presentedwith figurative statements in an X-is-Y cat-
egorization (e.g., Amind is a kitchen) or in an X-is-like-Y comparisonform (A mind is like a kitchen). In a preference rating task, subjects
indicatedwhich form they feltwasmore natural/sensible for a given
statement. It was found that the preference for the figurative state-
ments in a comparison form was higher for the novel than for the
conventional ones, providing evidence for more comparison-ori-
ented processing for novel than for conventionalmetaphors. In their
subsequent experiment, a mini-conventionalization procedure was
employed. Subjects were exposed to multiple, related novel figura-
tive statements prior to the target novel figurative statement. They
found that once the subjectswere familiarizedwith the relatedmap-
pings, the preference for the novel statements in a comparison form
was reduced. These findings support the theorized, functional shift
from comparison to categorization during metaphor conventionali-
zation. In contrast, Glucksberg andHaught (2006) argued that not all
novel metaphors benefit from comparison processing induced by
similes (X-is-like-Y). The claimwas supported in one of their studies
where novel metaphors were read faster when stated in X-is-Y than
in X-is-like-Y. Moving away from behavioral data, some suggested
that the differences between the processes of comparison and cate-
gorization for novel and conventional metaphors, if true, should be
observable in the brain. Because laterality studies have demon-
strated the importance of right hemisphere for novel, figurative lan-
guage (Mashal & Faust, 2009; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-
Beeman, 2007, but see Kacinik & Chiarello, 2007; Rapp, Mutschler,
& Erb, 2012), some suggested that figurative comparison and figura-
tive categorizationmay also be lateralized in the sameway (Chettih,
Durgin, & Grodner, 2012; Cardillo, Watson, Schmidt, Kranjec, &
Chatterjee, 2012). Using a divided visual field paradigm, Chettih
et al. (2012) did not find strong support for lateralized processes of
comparison and categorization. Using an imaging technique, Cardil-
lo et al. (2012) related prefrontal and left posterior temporal areas to
higher cognitive processes of comparison and categorization,
respectively.
The present paper examines whether mapping is in use and ex-
plores what mapping means as a cognitive process during compre-
hension, with a relational priming paradigm in combination with
the Event-Related Potential (ERP) method. Relational priming re-
fers to the phenomenon that an activated link/relation between a
pair of nodes/words on a semantic network can facilitate similar
relations held by other nodes/words. For example, a word pair
(e.g. bear-cave) can facilitate another word pair (e.g., bird-nest) that
denotes the same relation (live in) (Spellman, Holyoak, & Morrison,
2001). Relational priming is robust even when the prime and the
target share the same lexical items (Estes & Jones, 2006). We used
ERP as our primary dependent measure. In typical ERP studies of
language, subjects are presented with language materials while
their scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) is recorded. The EEG is
then processed, time-locked to the critical words, and averaged
over trials for each condition. The resulting averaged waveforms
display distinct ERP components at various time points, among
which lies the N400 component, a negative deflection starting at
around 250 ms and peaking at around 400 ms. The N400 is a
well-established component, reliably elicited when the critical
words are semantically incongruent with their preceding context
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). It is generally agreed that the N400 com-
ponent indexes semantic processing (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011),
although exactly which aspect of semantics is still debated (Baggio
& Hagoort, 2011; Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008). We will return to
this debate in Section 4.
Most ERP studies found more negative N400s for metaphors
relative to literals, with details of the findings differing in the
amplitudes and the peak latencies (Arzouan, Goldstein, & Faust,
2007; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002, 2007; De Grauwe, Swain,
Holcomb, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Lai, Curran, & Menn, 2009;
Lu & Zhang, 2012). For example, Lai et al. (2009) examined conven-
tional metaphors (e.g., Their theories have collapsed) and novel ones
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literal sentences (e.g., The buildings have collapsed) and anomalous
sentences (e.g., The apples have collapsed). The conventional and no-
vel metaphors elicited N400s as negative as the anomalous sen-
tences and more negative than the literals, initially (320–440 ms).
Shortly after (440–560 ms), the conventional metaphors converged
with the literals whereas the novelmetaphors remained as negative
as the anomalous. Such early N400 is also observed in other studies,
e.g., De Grauwe et al., 2010. Lai et al. (2009) suggested that the ini-
tial time window is likely where the ‘‘real’’ N400 occurs, whichmay
reflect the cognitive cost of the mapping process. The effects in the
later time window may not be N400, and may be reflecting the
activity of a distinct, later occurring process. This interpretation is
compatible with models assuming mapping as a domain-general
process for both metaphorical and complex literal language
(Coulson, 2001; Coulson & Davenport, 2012; Coulson & Van Petten,
2007).
Experiment 1 tested whether mappings are in use for under-
standing conventional and novel metaphors. We used the materi-
als from Lai et al. (2009) as our target sentences because those
materials were designed with conceptual mappings based on the
cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor (Lakoff, Espenson, & Gold-
berg, 1992), validated with pretests, and have elicited N400s more
negative than their literal counterparts. Subjects read target sen-
tences preceded by related and unrelated sentence-primes. In the
primed conditions, a conventional metaphorical sentence (e.g., Life
can sometimes be bumpy, from LIFE IS A ROAD metaphor) was pre-
ceded by a related sentence-prime (e.g., I can see the path of his life,
also from LIFE IS A ROAD metaphor). A novel metaphorical sen-
tence (e.g., Ideas can sometimes be bumpy, from a made-up new
metaphor IDEA IS A ROAD) was preceded by a related sentence-
prime (e.g., I can see the path of his ideas, also from IDEA IS A ROAD).
These new metaphors were not anomalous because people were
able to write down interpretations for these new metaphors but
not for the anomalous sentences (Lai et al., 2009). Control condi-
tions consist of literal and anomalous target sentences and their re-
lated/unrelated primes. In the unprimed conditions, the target
sentences were preceded by unrelated sentence-primes (e.g., She
borrowed some books from the library). Based on the Neural Theory
of Metaphor, related sentence-primes should facilitate conven-
tional metaphor target sentences, but not the novel ones. Based
on Gentner and colleagues, mapping is a process and therefore
an initiated process should influence similar process(es) in both
types of metaphors. Based on Keysar et al. (2000), related map-
pings should only be useful for novel metaphors and therefore
should only prime novel metaphors.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty-eight right-handed, native English-speaking students at
the University of Colorado Boulder participated in the EEG experi-
ment for course credits (16 males, mean age 20.6 years). All had
normal or corrected to-normal vision. None had neurological disor-
der or major head injury. Data were discarded from four subjects
due to excessive blinking (92.7% of the trials), coughing (45.3%),
and computer breakdowns.2.1.2. Materials and design
384 prime and target sentence pairs (96 quadruplets with 4
sentence types in each) were used for the related conditions
(Table 1 and Table S1 in Supplementary materials). The 384 target
sentences were from Lai et al. (2009). Their mean familiarity, inter-pretability, cloze probability ratings are listed in Table 1A. Conven-
tional metaphorical sentences were as familiar and interpretable as
the literal ones, and the two differed from each of the other condi-
tions. The averaged cloze probabilities for the four conditions did
not differ from one another. In addition, additional crowdsourcing
studies indicated that the target word sets in Lai et al. (2009) had a
mean ‘‘metaphorical sense frequency’’ (i.e., how often a word is
used metaphorically in naturally occurring text) of 53% (range 8–
91%) with a normal distribution (Munro et al., 2010; see also Bet-
hard, Lai, & Martin, 2009). The inclusion of an anomalous condition
is not necessary for the primary purpose of the current study,
examining priming effects. However, we included the anomalous
sentences so that direct comparison with Lai et al. (2009) can be
made (see analyses for the unprimed targets).
For each of the target sentences, a related for the primed and an
unrelated sentence-prime for the unprimed conditions were cre-
ated. The related sentence-primes were created with the same
source and target concepts (e.g., LIFE, ROAD) as in their paired tar-
get sentences (Table 1B). To control for potential lexical and struc-
tural priming, the sentence-primes and target sentences were
lexically and structurally matched in the literal control, conven-
tional metaphor, and novel metaphor conditions. The sentence-
primes and target sentences in the anomalous condition were only
lexically matched, not structurally matched, because structurally
matched sentences (e.g., I can see the path of his tastes) would have
looked anomalous and would allow subjects to form predictions
about the anomaly of the following targets. The unrelated sen-
tence-primes consist of 192 filler, literal sentences that contained
no content words that appeared in any of the 384 target sentences.
For example, ‘‘They eat bacon and eggs for breakfast everyday’’, ‘‘I put
my arm carefully around the cat’’, ‘‘Eddie leaned forward against the
desk’’, etc. Two native English speakers proofread all materials.
The 384 sentence-targets were divided into 4 blocks via Latin
Square rotation, so that each critical word appeared only once in
one of its target sentence frames in each block. As a result, each
block contained 24 conventional, 24 novel, 24 anomalous, and 24
literal targets. The orders in which the critical word appeared in
its literal, conventional, novel, and anomalous sentence frames
were counterbalanced between subjects, to control for potential
order effects. For the sentence-primes, there were two layers of
randomization, implemented separately for each subject, to avoid
potential idiosyncratic priming between primes and targets. In a
given block, half of the targets were randomly selected to be pre-
ceded by their paired related primes. The remaining half of the tar-
gets were preceded by unrelated primes. The unrelated primes
were randomly selected from the pool of the 192 fillers.2.1.3. Procedure
Participants first completed a consent form, followed by 20–
30 min Sensor Net setup, and a brief practice session. The experi-
ment took place in a quiet, dimly-lit room with white noise in
the background. Each trial consisted of a pair of a sentence-prime
and a sentence-target, presented word-by-word. Each sentence be-
gan with a fixation sign. Each word in each sentence was presented
for 200 ms with a length-dependent interword interval: 100 ms
plus an additional 37 ms for each character in the word. The final
critical word was presented together with a period until the sub-
ject responded. The subjects were instructed to determine how
much sense each sentence made by pressing either one of the four
keys (perfect sense = 3, some sense = 2, little sense = 1, and no
sense = 0) as quickly as possible. The order of the key assignments
(left to right, right to left) was counterbalanced between subjects.
Once a response was made, the program moved onto the next sen-
tence. Subjects were not informed about whether a given sentence
was a prime or a target.
Table 1
Example materials. (A) The target sentences for the literal, conventional metaphorical, novel metaphorical, and anomalous conditions, adopted from Lai et al. (2009), along with
their mean familiarity ratings, interpretability ratings, and cloze probabilities. (B) The related sentence-primes preceding the literal, conventional metaphorical, novel
metaphorical, and anomalous targets in Experiment 1. (C) The related simile-primes and literal-comparison-statement-primes preceding the literal, conventional metaphorical,
novel metaphorical, and anomalous conditions in Experiment 2.
(A) Exps. 1 and 2: Targets Target sentences Familiarity 0–3 scale Interpretability 0–3 scale Cloze probabilities
Literal Roads can sometimes be bumpy 2.4 2.7 0.05
Conventional Life can sometimes be bumpy 2.3 2.7 0.03
Novel Ideas can sometimes be bumpy 1.2 1.8 0.01
Anomalous Taste can sometimes be bumpy 0.6 1.2 0.00
(B) Exp 1: Primes Sentence-primes
Literal I can see the path of this road.
Conventional I can see the path of his life.
Novel I can see the path of his ideas.
For anomalous I was tasting the gum as I walked down the path.
(C) Exp 2: Primes Simile-primes/literal-comparison-primes
Literal A boulevard is like a road
Conventional Life is like a road
Novel Ideas are like roads
For anomalous A street is like a road
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Scalp voltages were collected with a 128-channel HydroCel
Geodesic Sensor NetTM connected to an AC coupled, 128-channel,
high-input impedance amplifier (200 MX, Net AmpsTM, Electrical
Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR). Amplified analog voltages (0.1–100 Hz
bandpass) were digitized at 250 Hz. Individual sensors were ad-
justed until impedances were less than 40 kX. The EEG was digi-
tally low-pass filtered at 40 Hz. Trials were discarded from
analyses if more than 20% of channels were bad (average ampli-
tude over 100 lV or transit amplitude over 50 lV). Trials with
blinks were removed from analysis. Individual bad channels were
replaced on a trial-by-trial basis with a spherical spline algorithm
(Srinivasan, Nunez, Tucker, Silberstein, & Cadusch, 1996). EEG was
measured with respect to a vertex reference (Cz), but transformed
to a linked mastoids reference later during analysis. Event-related
potentials (ERP) were obtained by stimulus-locked averaging of the
EEG recorded in each condition. ERPs were baseline-corrected with
a 200-ms pre-stimulus interval.
2.1.5. Overview of analyses
We first examined the priming effects by comparing the ERPs
for the primed and the unprimed targets. Then we analyzed the
priming effects in the sensicality ratings and reaction times. Lastly,
due to our a priori interest in comparing the current unprimed tar-
gets with Lai et al. (2009), we examined the unprimed targets
alone. Two corrections were applied (in this order): The Green-
house–Geisser sphericity correction (Greenhouse & Geisser,
1959) was applied to reported p values when df > 1. In cases where
multiple comparisons were carried out, the p-values were further
corrected based on the False Discovery Rate (FDR) procedure (Ben-
jamini & Hochberg, 1995).
2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Experiment 1: Primed vs. Unprimed Targets
The ERP waveforms for the unprimed and primed targets from
the representative (midline central) location are displayed in
Fig. 1A (See more electrodes in Supplementary materials, Fig-
ure S1). The ERPs appeared to be more negative for the unprimed
than for the primed in the typical N400 time window (300–
500 ms) for the metaphorical conditions, but not for the literal con-
trol, as expected. However, priming occurred in the anomalous
condition, unexpectedly. The scalp distributions of the priming ef-
fects for each condition in the 300–500 ms time window, obtainedby subtracting the primed from the unprimed, are displayed in
Fig. 1B.
Mean amplitudes for the unprimed and the primed targets were
extracted from the 300–500 ms time window over 63 electrode
sites, grouped into 9 locations (left anterior, middle anterior, right
anterior, left central, middle central, right central, left posterior,
middle posterior, right posterior), and entered into a repeated-
measures ANOVA of 2 prime (primed, unprimed)  4 condition
(anomalous, novel, conventional, literal)  3 left/mid/right loca-
tion  3 anterior/central/posterior location. The electrode locations
were selected to match the previous study (Lai et al., 2009). There
was no prime  condition interaction [F(3,69) = 1.54, p = .22)]. Nor
did either of the location factors interact with prime and/or
condition.
The lack of interaction might be due to the unexpected priming
in the anomalous condition. To better understand the unexpected
effects, we examined the priming in the anomalous condition at
an individual subject level, in the 300–500 ms window, over all
63 electrodes included in the analysis. We found that the effects
varied between subjects. Specifically, 6 out of our 24 subjects
showed large priming effects (mean = 2.99 lV), whereas the
remaining 18 showed little priming (mean = 0.17 lV) in the
anomalous condition. Thus we excluded these 6 subjects based
on the reasoning that they might have developed some strategy:
e.g., when seeing a long sentence-prime, the following target sen-
tence must be anomalous. The ERP waveforms based on the
remaining 18 subjects are displayed in Fig. 2A, and the effect scalp
distributions in the 300–500 ms time window, Fig. 2B (see more
electrodes in Supplementary materials, Figure S2).
Mean amplitudes from these 18 subjects were entered in a re-
peated-measures ANOVA of 2 prime  3 condition (literal, conven-
tional, novel)  3 left/mid/right location  3 anterior/central/
posterior location. Note that only 3 conditions without the anom-
alous condition were used in this analysis, to avoid double dipping
the anomalous condition (because the anomalous condition now
served as the selection criterion). We found a prime  3-condition
interaction [F(2,34) = 3.22, p < .05]. Pairwise comparisons showed
that priming effects were significant in conventional metaphors
[F(1,17) = 13.16, p = .006, FDR], non-significant in novel metaphors
[F(1,17) = 3.92, p = .12, FDR] and literal control (F < 1).
In addition, we reasoned that significant priming effects in the
metaphor conditions alone could reflect priming of mappings or/
and lexical priming, but priming effects in anomalous and literal,
although non-significant, can reflect potential lexical priming, so
Fig. 1. (A) Experiment 1, N = 24, Grand Average ERP waveforms for the literal (orange), conventional (red), novel (green), and anomalous (blue) targets in the unprimed (dark
lines) and primed (light lines) conditions at the mid-central sites. (B) Scalp distributions of the priming effects, subtracting the primed from the unprimed, in the 300–500 ms
time window in each condition.
Fig. 2. (A) Experiment 1, N = 18, Grand Average ERP waveforms for the literal (orange), conventional (red), novel (green), and anomalous (blue) targets in the unprimed (dark
lines) and primed (light lines) conditions at the mid-central sites. (B) Scalp distribution of the priming effects, subtracting the primed from the unprimed, in the 300–500 ms
time window in each condition.
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evidence for priming of conventional mappings with lexical prim-
ing controlled. Indeed, a post hoc comparison on the magnitudes of
the priming effects showed that the priming effects were greater in
conventional metaphors than in the literals [F(1,17) = 6.44, p < .05,
FDR].
Next, we examined the RT priming effects (Supplementary
materials, Figure S3). RTs for the unprimed and primed targets
were entered in a repeated-measures ANOVA of 2 prime  4 condi-
tion  4 block. Significant prime  condition interactions werefound, both in the N = 18 analysis [F(3,69) = 4.81, p < .05] and in
the N = 24 analysis [F(3,69) = 3.52, p < .05], with no prime  condi-
tion  block interaction (F < 1). Within each condition, the RT
priming effects were significant for the conventional [N = 18:
73 ms, F(1,23) = 18.22, p < .005; N = 24: 39 ms, F(1,23) = 5.23,
p = .08, FDR (p = .03 without FDR)], but not for the novel [N = 18:
34 ms, F(1,23) = 3.27, p = .0.17; N = 24: -37 ms, F(1,23) = 4.58,
p = .08, FDR]. The RT priming were non-significant for the
anomalous [N = 18: 25 ms, F < 1; N = 24: 8 ms, F < 1] and for the
literal [N = 18: 20 ms, F(1,23) = 2.58, p = .13; N = 24: 19 ms,
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tudes of RT priming effects, the RT priming effects were greater
in conventional metaphors than in the literals [N = 18:
F(1,17) = 8.68, p < .005; N = 24: F(1,23) = 12.68, p < .005, FDR].
Sensicality ratings for the unprimed and primed targets were
entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA of 2 prime (primed, un-
primed)  4 condition  4 block. There was no prime  condition
or prime  condition  block interaction [N = 18: F(3,51) = 1.89,
p = .15; N = 24: F < 1]. There were main effects of condition
[N = 18: F(3,51) = 181.99, p < 0.0001, N = 24: F(3,69) = 332.75,
p < 0.001] and of priming [N = 18: F(1,17) = 7.24, p < 0.05, N = 24:
F(1,23) = 3.58, p = 0.07].
2.2.2. Experiment 1: Unprimed targets
Next, we examined the unprimed targets, for our a priori inter-
est comparing the current data with Lai et al. (2009). The repre-
sentative ERP waveforms from the midline central location are
displayed in Fig. 3, both for data based on N = 24 (Fig. 3, left)
and for data based on N = 18 (Fig. 3, right) (See more electrodes
in Supplementary materials, Figure S4). Visual inspection indi-
cates that both the metaphorical and anomalous conditions di-
verged from the literal control a little before 300 ms, peaked atFig. 3. Experiment 1, Grand Average ERP waveforms for the literal (orange), conventional
mid-central sites, for N = 24 (left) and for N = 18 (right). The scalp distributions of the effec
window, are displayed at the bottom.400 ms, and converged back together before 500 ms. These pat-
terns seem different from those in Lai et al. (2009), where there
was a distinction between an early (320–440 ms) and a late
(440–560 ms) time frames. Preliminary analyses of the present
data did not show a clear differentiation between early and late
effects. Because Lai et al. (2009) suggested that in their data the
actual N400 effects were revealed in their early time window,
here we assumed that there was really only one window as the
representative N400 time window, which is manifested in the
300–500 ms in the current case. This selection is also consistent
with the past N400 literature. The scalp distributions of the
N400 effects, obtained by subtracting the literal control from each
other condition, are displayed in Fig. 3.
Mean amplitudes for the unprimed targets were extracted from
the 300–500 ms time windows over 63 electrodes grouped into 9
locations. A repeated-measures ANOVA of 4 condition  3 left/
mid/right location  3 anterior/central/posterior location showed
a main effect of condition [N = 18: F(3,51) = 3.91, p < .05; N = 24:
F(3,69) = 3.35, p < .05]. N400s for the anomalous and metaphorical
conditions were more negative than the literals, both for the N = 18
analysis [anomalous vs. literal: F(1,17) = 4.10, p < .05, FDR; novel
vs. literal: F(1,17) = 7.06, p < .05, FDR; conventional vs. literal:(red), novel (green), and anomalous (blue) targets in the unprimed conditions at the
ts, subtracting the literal control from each other condition, in the 300–500 ms time
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vs. literal: F(1,23) = 7.63, p < .05, FDR; novel vs. literal: F(1,23) =
5.38, p < .05, FDR; conventional vs. literal: F(1,23) = 4.69, p < .05,
FDR]. These patterns of results were consistent with those in Lai
et al. (2009) who also found that the anomalous and metaphorical
conditions were more negative than the literals in their (early)
N400 window.
The RTs for the unprimed targets were entered in a repeated-
measures ANOVA of 4 condition  4 block. There was a main effect
of condition, both in the N = 18 analysis [F(3,51) = 14.55, p < .0001]
and in the N = 24 one [F(3,69) = 23.99, p < .0001]. No block  con-
dition interaction (F < 1). Pairwise comparisons showed that the
literal was faster than the conventional [N = 18: F(1,17) = 15.29,
p < .005; N = 24: F(1,23) = 34.16, p < .0001, FDR], the novel
[N = 18: F(1,17) = 33.31, p < .0001; N = 24: F(1,23) = 57.55,
p < .0001, FDR], and the anomalous [N = 18: F(1,17) = 12.76,
p < .01; N = 24: F(1,23) = 19.05, p < .0001, FDR]. The conventional
were faster than the novel [N = 18: F(1,17) = 12.76, p < .005;
N = 24: F(1,23) = 14.92, p < .005, FDR].
The sensicality ratings for the unprimed target sentences were
also entered in a repeated-measures ANOVA of 4 condition  4
block. There was a main effect of condition, both when N = 18
[F(3,51) = 163.41, p < .0001] and when N = 24 [F(3,69) = 214.09,
p < .0001]. No block  condition interaction (F < 1). Pairwise com-
parisons showed that the literal made more sense than the conven-
tional [N = 18: F(1,17) = 16.79, p < .001; N = 24: F(1,23) = 27.32,
p < .0001, FDR], the novel [N = 18: F(1,17) = 114.38, p < .0001;
N = 24: F(1,23) = 202.79, p < .0001, FDR], and the anomalous
[N = 18: F(1,17) = 237.43, p < .0001; N = 24: F(1,23) = 363.12,
p < .0001, FDR]. The conventional made more sense than the novel
[N = 18: F(1,17) = 105.10, p < .0001; N = 24: F(1,23) = 119.4,
p < .0001, FDR] and the anomalous [N = 18: F(1,17) = 187.19,
p < .0001; N = 24: F(1,23) = 250.77, p < .0001, FDR]. The novel made
more sense than the anomalous [N = 18: F(1,17) = 99.56, p < .0001;
N = 24: F(1,23) = 159.42, p < .0001, FDR].2.2.3. Experiment 1: Discussion
Conventional metaphorical expressions designed with concep-
tual mappings, when unprimed, elicited N400s more negative than
the literals. When primed with related conventional metaphorical
expressions, they elicited N400s less negative than they did when
they were unprimed. This priming holds when taking into consid-
eration potential lexical priming obtained based on the literal con-
dition. This suggests that the N400 effect for the conventional
relative to the literals in the unprimed condition may reflect a cog-
nitive cost as a result of the semantic operation of mapping. In
addition, it took less time to make sense of the conventional met-
aphors in the primed than the unprimed, suggesting that activated
mappings may have facilitated the decision making to some extent.
Novel metaphorical expressions designed with novel mappings,
when unprimed, also elicited N400s more negative than the liter-
als. However, when primed by related novel metaphorical expres-
sions, they still elicited N400s as negative as they did when they
were unprimed. One interpretation is that there is simply no map-
ping for novel metaphors, at least not for the kind of novel meta-
phor examples examined here. Alternatively, a mapping process
was initiated by the sentence-prime, but was slow-going and
spilled over to the processing of the following target sentence.
The latter interpretation is supported by an examination of the
RTs of all the sentence-primes, which showed that the RTs were
longer for the novel sentence-primes than for all the other sen-
tence-primes (each p < .05). Perhaps the system, although slowed,
processed the novel sentence-primes, but needed more time to se-
lect and re-select appropriate inferences when it came to the novel
target sentences.There are a couple of potential caveats in Experiment 1, which
suggest cautious interpretation. First, we observed relatively large
priming effects in the anomalous condition in the N = 24 analysis,
which we considered was introduced by a subset of the subjects
(N = 6). We suggested that these subjects might have noticed that
the sentence-primes preceding the anomalous targets were odd
and long (e.g., ‘‘I was tasting the gum as I walked down the path’’),
andwere able to form prediction about the sensicality of the follow-
ing target sentences.We therefore carried out the analyses based on
the remaining eighteen subjectswho showed no or little priming ef-
fects in the anomalous condition, using the other three non-anoma-
lous conditions. Our interpretations are based on these results.
Another point for consideration is that we used the time win-
dow 300–500 ms for the N400 analyses here, which is consistent
with the N400 literature, but is inconsistent with Lai et al. (2009)
where two distinct windows (320–440 ms and 440–560 ms) were
reported. We suspect that this discrepancy is due to a procedural
difference between the present and the past studies. In the present
study, we instructed our subjects to make immediate responses
because we were interested in potential RT priming. Lai et al.
(2009) delayed subjects’ responses to avoid hand/motor movement
during the time region of interest. With immediate responses, sub-
jects may have responded immediately without contemplating fur-
ther in the late window. With delayed responses, subjects may
have continued to try and make sense of the novel metaphors, giv-
ing rise to some additional effects in the late window. This is con-
sistent with the suggestion in Lai et al. (2009) that their early
window is likely the real N400 and the later window may reflect
the activity of a later occurring process.
Overall, Experiment 1 yielded positive yet preliminary evidence
supporting the use of mapping in comprehending conventional
metaphors, but not the novel ones. In Experiment 2, we investi-
gated whether the cognitive processes required for mapping differ
in conventional and novel metaphors. We also further addressed
the caveats in Experiment 1.3. Experiment 2
To test whether metaphors are processed via comparison, we
followed Bowdle and Gentner (2005) and Glucksberg and Haught
(2006) in using figurative statements in a comparison form X-is-
like-Y (i.e., simile) to induce comparison thinking. We primed the
metaphor target sentences with their related similes. In the primed
conditions, a conventional metaphorical sentence (e.g., Life can
sometimes be bumpy) was preceded by a related simile-prime
(e.g., Life is like a road). A novel metaphorical target sentence
(e.g., Ideas can sometimes be bumpy) was preceded by a related sim-
ile-prime (e.g., Ideas are like roads). Control conditions with literal
and anomalous target sentences and their related/unrelated
primes, length-matched between primes, were also included. We
specifically matched the lengths between all the primes in Exper-
iment 2, to avoid unexpected priming in the anomalous condition
observed in Experiment 1. In the unprimed conditions, the target
sentences were preceded by unrelated literal comparison state-
ments (e.g., A mallet is like a hammer). We used literal comparison
statements because while their visual form looks like a simile, they
function differently from similes and metaphors. The two concepts
used in a literal comparison statement are much more alike than
the two concepts used in a simile (and metaphor), which are from
dissimilar semantic fields. In addition, reversing literal comparison
statements results in meaningful reading (‘‘A hammer is like a mal-
let’’) whereas reversing similes (and metaphors) yields anomalies
(Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978). Thus we assumed that
literal comparison statements are less comparison inducing than
similes.
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itate novel metaphors only, supporting mapping as a comparison
process in novel metaphors and no comparison in conventional
metaphors. Second, similes would facilitate both types of meta-
phors. This would mean the same cognitive process, very likely
comparison, for both metaphor types. In this scenario, convention-
ality might modulate how comparison impacts metaphor process-
ing, which could be revealed in the timing, the magnitudes, or/and
the scalp distributions of the priming effects (cf. Cardillo et al.,
2012; Desai et al., 2011). Third, similes would facilitate neither
type of metaphors and comparison is irrelevant.
In Experiment 2 we also cleaned up the design issues in Exper-
iment 1. In terms of the procedure, we instructed the participants
to respond immediately as in Experiment 1, not as in Lai et al.
(2009). Therefore we expected the unprimed conditions to repli-
cate Experiment 1, not Lai et al. (2009). We also matched the
primes for the anomalous condition with other conditions better
to avoid unwanted priming in the anomalous condition.3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-nine right-handed, native English-speaking students at
the University of Colorado Boulder participated in this experiment
for course credits (19 men, mean age 21.5). None had any neuro-
logical disorder or major head injury. All had normal or corrected
to-normal vision. Data were discarded from five subjects: one
had attention deficit disorder, one had excessive movements, one
had diagnosed depression, and two had excessive blinking (>50%
of trials).3.1.2. Materials and design
All materials and design were the same as Experiment 1, except
for the primes. For the related conditions, similes were used as the
primes for the metaphor conditions (Table 1C and Table S2 in Sup-
plementary materials). The primes in the literal and anomalous
conditions were created by pairing the concept in the target sen-
tence (ROAD) with a near synonym of that concept (e.g., street, bou-
levard). The primes for the anomalous targets in Experiment 2 were
length- and structure- matched with the primes for the other three
conditions, so that no prediction can be made about the sensicality
for the upcoming anomalous targets prior to encountering the tar-
gets. Two native English speakers reviewed these primes to ensure
that there were no category statements (e.g., A dog is like an ani-
mal), non-simile usage of ‘‘like’’ (e.g., discourse marker), or anoma-
lous A is like a B phrases (e.g., Canines are like dogs is considered
anomalous because canines are dogs).
For the unrelated conditions, 192 literal comparison statements
(e.g., A mallet is like a hammer) were used as the primes. Literal
comparison statements were created by searching on Google and
selecting among ‘‘synsets’’ (i.e., groups of words that are roughly
synonymous in a given context) on WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998).
Two native speakers of English reviewed these literal comparison
statements and excluded items that had the same content words
as in the targets, items such as ‘‘Comestibles are like food’’ because
comestibles are food, and items that may be perceived as similes
due to the dissimilarity of the stated concepts.3.1.3. Procedure and electrophysiological recording
All procedures and electrophysiological recording were the
same as Experiment 1.3.1.4. Overview of analyses
Same as Experiment 1.3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Experiment 2: Primed vs. Unprimed targets
The ERP waveforms for the unprimed and the primed targets,
averaged over the representative (mid-central) electrodes sur-
rounding CZ, are displayed in Fig. 4A (see more electrodes in Sup-
plementary materials, Figure S5). The ERPs were more negative for
the unprimed than for the primed in the typical N400 time window
(300–500 ms) for the metaphorical conditions, but not for the lit-
eral control or the anomalous, as expected. The scalp distributions
of the effects from 300–500 ms time window are displayed in
Fig. 4B.
Mean amplitudes were extracted from the 300–500 ms time
window over the 63 electrodes and entered into a repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA of 2 prime  4 condition  3 left/mid/right  3 ante-
rior/central/posterior. There was no prime  condition interaction
[F(3,69) = 2.13, p = .11] but a prime  condition left/middle/right
interaction [F(6,138) = 2.44, p < .05]. Therefore separate ANOVAs
were carried out for examining the interaction effects at the left,
the midline, and the right. A prime  condition interaction was
found along the midline sites [F(3,69) = 3.73, p < .05, FDR], not on
the left (F < 1) or the right sites [F(3,69) = 1.77, p = .17, FDR]. Within
themidline sites, pairwise comparisons showed significant priming
effects for the conventional [F(1,23) = 11.12, p < .005, FDR] and the
novel [F(1,23) = 22.89, p < .0001, FDR]. No priming was found for
the anomalous [F < 1] or the literal [F(1,23) = 2.03, p = .17, FDR], as
expected. In addition, comparing the magnitudes of the priming ef-
fects, the priming effects for novel metaphors were greater than the
non-significant priming effects in the literal condition
[F(1,23) = 3.20, p < .05, FDR]. However, the priming effects for con-
ventional metaphors were only marginally greater than the effects
in the literal controls [F(1,23) = 2.86, p < .10 and p = .07, FDR ].
RTs (Supplementary materials, Figure S7) for the unprimed and
primed targets were also entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA
of 2 prime  4 condition  4 block. There was a prime  condition
interaction [F(3,69) = 4.431, p < .05]. Block did not interact with
prime and/or condition (F < 1). The RT priming effects were signif-
icant for the conventional (80 ms, F(1,23) = 23.10, p < .0001, FDR)
and the novel (37 ms, F(1,23) = 4.88, p < .05, FDR); non-significant
for the anomalous (1 ms, F < 1) and the literal (24 ms,
F(1,23) = 1.95, p = .17, FDR), as expected. Next, comparing the mag-
nitudes of the priming effects, the RT priming effects were greater
in conventional metaphors than in the literals [F(1,23) = 12.68,
p < .005, FDR]. The RT priming effects were not greater in novel
metaphors than in the literal (F < 1).
Sensicality ratings for the unprimed and primed targets were
entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA of 2 prime  4 condi-
tion  4 block. There was a marginal prime  condition interaction
[F(3,69) = 2.46, p = .06]. Block did not interact with prime and/or
condition (F < 1). There were main effects of condition
[F(3,69) = 248.43, p < 0.001] and of priming [F(1,23) = 12.84,
p < 0.005].
3.2.2. Experiment 2: Unprimed targets
Next, we examined the unprimed targets, for comparing the
current data with Experiment 1 and Lai et al. (2009). The represen-
tative ERP waveforms from the midline central location are dis-
played in Fig. 5 (see more electrodes in Supplementary materials,
Figure S6). Visual inspection suggests that the ERP patterns seem
similar to Experiment 1 but different from Lai et al. (2009). Thus
as Experiment 1, we also used 300–500 ms as our N400 analysis
window. The scalp distributions of the N400 effects, obtained by
subtracting the literal controls from each other condition, are dis-
played in Fig. 5.
Mean amplitudes for the unprimed targets were extracted from
the 300–500 ms time windows over 63 electrodes, grouped into 9
Fig. 4. (A) Experiment 2, Grand Average ERP waveforms for the literal (orange), conventional (red), novel (green), and anomalous (blue) targets in the unprimed (dark lines)
and primed (light lines) conditions at the mid-central sites. B. Scalp distribution of the priming effects, subtracting the primed from the unprimed, in the 300–500 ms time
window in each condition.
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right location  3 anterior/central/posterior location showed a
main effect of condition [F(3,69) = 4.03, p < .05]. N400s for the
anomalous and the metaphorical conditions were more negative
than the literals [anomalous vs. literal: F(1,23) = 5.09, p < .05,
FDR; novel vs. literal: F(1,23) = 11.77, p < .01, FDR; conventional
vs. literal: F(1,23) = 3.72, p = .05, FDR].
The RTs for the unprimed targets were analyzed with a re-
peated-measures ANOVA of 4 condition 4 block. There was a
main effect of condition [F(3,69) = 23.99, p < .0001]. Block did not
interact with condition (F < 1). Pairwise comparisons showed that
the literal was faster than the conventional [F(1,23) = 34.16,
p < .0001, FDR], the novel [F(1,23) = 57.55, p < .0001, FDR], and
the anomalous [F(1,23) = 34.95, p < .0001, FDR]. The conventional
were faster than the novel [F(1,23) = 14.92, p < .0001, FDR], and
the novel were faster than the anomalous [F(1,23) = 14.48,
p < .001, FDR].
The sensicality ratings for the unprimed targets were analyzed
with a repeated-measures ANOVA of 4 condition  4 block. There
was a main effect of condition [F(3,69) = 209.20, p < .0001]. Block
did not interact with condition [F(9,207) = 1.16, p = .32]. Pairwise
comparisons showed the literal made more sense than the conven-
tional [F(1,23) = 27.64, p < .0001, FDR], the novel [F(1,23) = 199.43,
p < .0001, FDR], and the anomalous [F(1,23) = 362.34, p < .0001,
FDR]. The conventional made more sense than the novel
[F(1,23) = 120.22, p < .0001, FDR] and the anomalous
[F(1,23) = 269.67, p < .0001, FDR]. The novel made more sense than
the anomalous [F(1,23) = 172.08, p < .0001, FDR].
3.2.3. Experiment 2: Discussion
Both conventional and novel metaphorical expressions, when
unprimed, elicited N400s more negative than literal sentences in
the 300–500 ms time window, as in Experiment 1 and Lai et al.
(2009). When primed with related similes, both types of metaphor-
ical expressions elicited less negative N400s than they did when
they were unprimed. When potential lexical priming effects ob-
tained from the literal condition, although non-significant, were
subtracted from the priming effects in the metaphorical conditions,the N400 priming effects became marginally significant in conven-
tional metaphors, but remained significant in novel metaphors.
The RT priming effects occurring later (1300–1400 ms) were signif-
icant for both conventional and novel metaphors. After subtraction
of literal priming, the RT priming effects remained significant in
conventional metaphors, but became non-significant in novel
metaphors.
We suggest two possible interpretations for the differences be-
tween the ERP and RT patterns for conventional and novel priming
effects. One is that comparison induced by similes impacts conven-
tional and novel metaphors at different time points: Comparison
facilitated novel metaphors at an initial stage of mapping, such as
the structural alignment of the involved concepts, as reflected by
the ERP priming. However, the initial facilitation trailed off, as re-
flected by the lack of greater RT priming for novel metaphors than
for literals, perhaps because putting two concepts together side by
side does not alwaysmean that it makes perfect sense to do so. That
is, when it came to the inference importation stage downstream of
processing, thenovel inferenceswereno longer deemedappropriate
for importation. In the case of conventional metaphors, at the initial
structural alignment stage, comparison facilitated conventional
metaphors, but not much more effective than its facilitatory effect
for literals, as reflected by the marginally greater ERP priming for
conventional metaphors than for literals. This may be because con-
ventional metaphors only required a short burst of effort, and so the
extent to which it can be facilitated was limited. But at a later stage,
comparison could be of great help in expanding selection of infer-
ences in these conventional metaphors, as reflected by the greater
RT priming for conventional metaphors than for literals. This inter-
pretation suggests that bothconventional andnovelmetaphorsben-
efit fromcomparison inducedby similes, but the timing atwhich the
facilitation occurs depends on conventionality.
Another possible interpretation is that comparison is not the
first processing route when it comes to interpreting conventional-
ized metaphors. Adding an additional way of thinking might re-
quire more cognitive effort, enhancing the N400 in the primed.
However, readers can certainly be led to process conventional
metaphors in a comparison way, eventually. So despite the initial
Fig. 5. Experiment 2, Grand Average ERP waveforms for the literal (orange), conventional (red), novel (green), and anomalous (blue) targets in the unprimed conditions at the
mid-central sites. The scalp distributions of the effects, subtracting the literal control from each other condition, in the 300–500 ms time window, are displayed at the bottom.
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literals, comparison ultimately encouraged mapping at a later time
point, accepting more inferences not typically accepted, hence the
significant RT priming greater for conventional metaphors than for
literals. In the case of novel metaphors, comparison is perhaps in-
deed the default processing route for making sense of novel meta-
phors. Thus related similes naturally facilitated the process, as
reflected by the ERP priming. However, because the novel meta-
phor examples tested here were too new and unfamiliar, the initial
boost might not be sustainable downstream of processing, as re-
flected by the lack of greater RT priming for novel metaphors than
for literals. This interpretation suggests that while both conven-
tional and novel metaphors benefit from comparison induced by
similes, comparison is necessary for novel metaphors, and is useful
but may not be necessary for conventional metaphors.
Experiment 2 also clarified the issue of the unexpected priming
observed in the anomalous targets in Experiment 1. We suggested
the unexpected priming in Experiment 1was due to the non-match-
ing sentence lengths and structures of the sentence-primes. In
Experiment 2, wematched all of these stimulus properties between
the primes, and successfully eliminated the unexpected priming in
the anomalous condition.4. General discussion
The present study used ERP to investigate (1) whether concep-
tual mappings are in use during the comprehension of conven-
tional and novel metaphorical expressions, and (2) what
mapping means as a process for the two types of metaphors. We
used metaphorical sentences designed with conventional and no-
vel mapping relations based on cognitive linguistic theories, vali-
dated in a previous study (Lai et al., 2009) as our target
sentences, and we primed these sentences with related and unre-
lated primes. In Experiment 1, we used sentence-primes to expose
subjects to relevant mappings. We found that the sentence-primes
were effective in priming the related conventional metaphorical
expressions, but not the novel ones. Priming effects for the conven-
tional metaphors held even when potential lexical priming ob-
tained via literal sentences was subtracted, in both the ERP and
RT measures. In Experiment 2, we used simile-primes to initiate
a comparison process. We found that simile-primes were effective
in priming both related conventional and novel metaphorical
expressions. However after subtraction of literal priming, the ERP
priming effects remained significant in novel metaphors, but be-
came marginal in conventional metaphors. The RT priming effects
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metaphors.
These findings can be best accounted for by the Career of Met-
aphor Theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). The theory posits that
mapping as a process consists of the alignment of the involved con-
cepts first and then the importation of the appropriate inferences,
and that there are multi-routes for mappings for conventional met-
aphors and a single route for novel metaphors (Bowdle & Gentner,
2005, Fig. 4). In the case of conventional metaphors, even though
the involved concepts have pre-experimentally been frequently
paired, and inferences, frequently drawn, the conventional meta-
phors still needed to go through the mapping process, as reflected
by their more negative N400s compared to the literals when un-
primed (Experiments 1 and 2). When primed, the sentence-primes
in Experiment 1 cued the relevant concepts and frequently mapped
inferences. Therefore when the target sentences appeared, the sys-
tem only needed to make use of the activated concepts and infer-
ences for outputting interpretations, hence the N400 and RT
priming effects. In Experiment 2, comparison induced by similes
might have carried out mappings from both the original literal
reading of the source concept and its conventionalized metaphoric
reading (e.g., shark as an animal, shark as a tenacious human being)
to the target concept (lawyer). Activations of multiple meanings of
the source concept and the multi-routes of mapping presumably
increased the amount of resources needed for aligning the predi-
cates between the concepts, hence although the significant ERP
priming effects for conventional metaphors, the effects were only
marginally larger than the literals. However similes facilitated
the later stage of the mapping process eventually, regardless of
which route the mappings underwent, therefore in the RT time
window we still observed larger RT priming effects for the conven-
tional than for the literals. Overall these findings provide support
for the use of mapping in conventional metaphors, consistent with
past studies that examined conventional metaphors with specific
content (e.g., Gentner et al., 2002; Saygin et al., 2010; Desai
et al., 2011). These findings also provide some evidence for the
multi-route possibilities at the early stage of mapping during the
comprehension of conventional metaphors. It appears that while
the preferred route for conventional metaphors may not always
be a comparison process, comparison can eventually facilitate the
interpretation of conventional metaphors.
In the case of novel metaphors, because the novel metaphor
examples tested here were created by pairing concepts that were
never or infrequently paired pre-experimentally, only mappings
from the original literal reading of the source concept to the target
concept was possible. Going through the structural alignment and
inference importation, novel metaphors elicited more negative
N400s than the literals when unprimed (Experiments 1 and 2).
When primed, the sentence-primes in Experiment 1 were sup-
posed to activate the relevant concepts and inferences. But the null
ERP and RT priming indicate that activations might not have been
successful. The system might be uncertain about which concepts
and inferences were supposed to be conjured based on the lexical
cues in the sentence-primes. The finding that the sentence-primes
did not facilitate mappings in novel metaphors seems inconsistent
with several past studies (Gentner & Boronat, 1992; Keysar et al.,
2000; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). This is likely because the novel
metaphor examples in the present study were created via novel
pairing of concepts, whereas most examples in the past studies
used the unused aspects of a conventional metaphor. For example,
‘‘His criticism was a guided cruise missile’’ (Keysar et al., 2000) is a
novel extension of the conventional ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor,
which might have made the structural alignment and inference
importation accessible. The simile-primes in Experiment 2 were
effective in facilitating novel metaphors, to the extent that the
ERP priming effects in novel were greater than those in the literals,suggesting that similes invited construction of new inferences.
Simile-primes also facilitated the RTs for novel metaphors, but
not more so than the literals, probably because the initially proba-
ble inferences were later judged to be not as appropriate as they
first seemed due to the novelty of the examples. We interpreted
these findings as being supportive of the use of mapping in inter-
preting novel metaphors, and such mapping is essentially a com-
parison process similarly to that used in interpreting similes.
Are metaphors processed via comparison and comparison
alone? Based on the ERP and RT priming effects within each con-
dition, comparison induced by similes facilitated both conven-
tional and novel metaphors, suggesting that metaphors are
processed via comparison. However, based on the more stringent
analysis subtracting the priming effects in the literals from each
of the metaphor conditions, comparison facilitated novel meta-
phors initially, and comparison facilitated conventional metaphors
downstream of processing. The stringent analysis suggests that
the ways in which comparison impacts conventional and novel
metaphors are different. In Experiment 2 discussion we laid out
2 possible differences: (1) Comparison impacts conventional and
novel metaphors at different times/stages; (2) Comparison is nec-
essary for interpreting novel metaphors; it is not necessarily ini-
tially but can be useful for interpreting conventional metaphors.
These two are not mutually exclusive, as earliness in the time
course oftentimes implies necessity. Both possibilities support
the importance of comparison in metaphor mappings, which chal-
lenge theories that suggest comparison as being peripheral during
metaphor comprehension (Glucksberg & Haught, 2006). Some
have also suggested that the distinction between categorization
and comparison may be manifested as hemispheric or frontal-pos-
terior differences (Cardillo et al., 2012; Mashal & Faust, 2009). The
scalp distributions of the priming effects in the current study do
not support a locational difference. Based on our findings we sug-
gest that categorization and comparison, just like conventional
and novel metaphors, may have a shared mapping process and dif-
fer only in terms of the extent of inferences that can be projected
from one concept to the other (cf. Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). The
more conventional a metaphor example is, the more the infer-
ences there are available to be imported, and therefore the greater
the facilitation.
Our findings provide partial support for the Neural Theory of
Metaphor (Lakoff, 2009). One of the central tenants of this theory
suggests that conventional mappings are fixed representations
stored in the long-term memory, whereas novel mappings are
not represented. Experiment 1 showed that an activated conven-
tional mapping could prime examples with similar mappings, sup-
porting the theory. However, in Experiment 2, similes primed
related metaphorical expressions, even when the expression was
novel, which is inconsistent with the theory. A more productive
way to move forward is to consider mapping as a process, not as
a fixed representation. While a conventional mapping may be a fre-
quent pattern of activation, it is not permanently fixed or stored.
The pattern of activation should be flexible depending on the con-
text, which is consistent with recent finding showing that conven-
tional metaphors can be de-conventionalized (Goldstein, Arzouan,
& Faust, 2012). In a comparison context, people are more likely to
exploit new readings of old mappings as well as create new map-
pings between concepts.
One issue that has been heavily researched in the past behav-
ioral studies of metaphor is whether metaphorical and literal sen-
tences are processed differently. Based on reaction times, most
found that metaphorical and literal meanings are understood at
the same time, but some studies found that metaphors are under-
stood more slowly than literals (Gerrig & Healy, 1983). In our un-
primed conditions, although the N400s for the metaphors and
the literals fell within the same time frame (300–500 ms), the
V. Tzuyin Lai, T. Curran / Brain & Language 127 (2013) 484–496 495N400 amplitudes for metaphors were significantly more negative
than the literals. This is consistent with studies using speed-accu-
racy-tradeoff asymptote as a dependent measure for revealing the
differences between metaphorical and literal meanings. McElree
and Nordlie (1999) found that while the temporal dynamics for fig-
urative and literal statements are the same, the asymptotic accu-
racy was lower in figurative than in literal statements, suggesting
that figurative interpretations are less constrained than the literal.
We have attributed the N400 amplitude difference between our
metaphors and our literals to the amount of difficulty triggered
by the mapping process. That is, mapping the dissimilar concepts
in metaphors may be more resource intensive than mapping the
similar concepts in literals, and a resource intensive process does
not have to take longer than a less intensive process – different amounts
of effort can be completed within the same time (cf. Coulson & Van
Petten, 2002). In terms of theoretical interpretation, the amount of
predicates/inferences available for mapping can be another way
of viewing how constraining figurative meaning is, but more
evidence is needed for validating this theory.
The current finding also has implications for the functional
interpretations of N400. In the language N400 literature, there
has been an ongoing debate on whether literal-anomalous N400
effect reflects ‘‘an ease of lexical retrieval’’ (Kutas & Federmeier,
2000) or ‘‘post-lexical integration’’ (Brown & Hagoort, 1993;
Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004). The lexical account
suggests that N400 reflects the ease of lexical retrieval of the target
word, with the degree of easiness modulated by sentential context
pre-lexically. The integration account suggests that N400 reflects
how difficult it is for the retrieved target word to integrate with
its preceding context, post-lexically. Recent development of this
debate has primarily gone two directions, among others. The first
direction accentuates the differences between the two accounts.
In a review paper, Lau et al. (2008) showed that one of the impor-
tant neurogenerators of N400 lies within the posterior middle tem-
poral cortex, which according to imaging data on single words
serves lexical-semantic processing. This provides support for the
lexical account and rules out a pure integration based account
for N400. In another review paper, Brouwer, Fitz, and Hoeks
(2012) showed that the type of stimuli giving rise to N400s always
pre-activates lexical targets, and that the type of stimuli that re-
quires reanalysis or post-lexical integration elicit a late positive
component. Their proposal restricted N400 to strictly lexical and
argued that any post-lexcial integration is indexed in the late posi-
tive component (see also Kuperberg, 2007). Instead of accentuating
the differences, the second direction focuses on the commonality
of the two accounts. Coulson and Federmeier (2002) suggested that
the lexical vs. post-lexical processes may be highly interactive and
interdependent. Federmeier (2007) and Hagoort, Baggio, and Wil-
lems (2009) suggested that lexical and post-lexical processes
may be occurring in the left and right hemispheres concurrently.
Baggio and Hagoort (2011) further suggested that both the lexical,
non-combinatorial processes in the middle temporal cortex and
the post-lexical, combinatorial processes in the inferior frontal cor-
tex may be happening at the same time.
The current metaphor-literal N400 effect very likely reflects
both lexical and post-lexical processes. Lai et al. (2009) proposed
that the N400s for metaphors relative to literal sentences in their
early windowmay be the N400 and that the ERPs observed in their
late window may be reflecting continuation of the processes
underlying the early N400. The current study verified this proposal.
But this still leaves us with the questions which aspect of the map-
ping process is reflected by the N400 specifically and how N400 in
metaphor processing relates to the neurobiology of language in
general. As we now have proposed to view mapping as a process,
not as a representation, we suggest that any ease of processing
during this mapping operation should lead to a reduction ofN400, be it retrieval of concepts, or integration between the re-
trieved concepts. Perhaps the sentence-primes (Experiment 1)
aid more on the concept retrieval of the mapping process whereas
the simile-primes (Experiment 2) aid more on the inference inte-
gration of the process. Thus both the retrieval of concepts and
the integration of inferences may underlie the observed N400s.
Our findings are consistent with neurobiological models of lan-
guage in which N400 reflects joint lexical and post-lexical effects
(Baggio & Hagoort, 2011; Coulson & Federmeier, 2002) and are
inconsistent with accounts in which N400 must be strictly lexical
(Brouwer et al., 2012) or pure post-lexical (Brown & Hagoort,
1993).
Finally, there are a couple of caveats in the current study. First,
the sensicality rating task with a four-point scale (perfect sense = 3,
some sense = 2, little sense = 1, and no sense = 0) seemed compli-
cated. We intended to use this rating scheme to encourage our par-
ticipants to think more about meaning, but the combination of the
4-point scale and the requirement of an immediate response might
have affected the results. For example, the participants might de-
cide that they could make some sense of some of the anomalous
sentences, which would lead to a less negative N400. Future stud-
ies are needed for examining task effects on the processing of lit-
eral and non-literal language. The second caveat is the concern of
lexical priming. Although we meticulously controlled for lexical
priming by controlling for the basic properties of the stimuli and
by subtracting priming effects obtained in the literal control from
the effects obtained in the metaphorical conditions, it is possible
that the degrees of lexical priming in literal and metaphorical con-
ditions might not be equal. If lexical priming was larger in literal
than in metaphorical conditions, then we have subtracted more
than needed, which would still support our current conclusion. If,
however, lexical priming was larger in metaphorical than in literal
conditions, then some lexical priming could confound the priming
of mappings. Future studies are needed to elucidate the latter
scenario.
In conclusion, the point of departure of this study is to examine
whether mappings are in use in metaphorical language, and what
mapping means as a process. We found that sentence-primes with
mappings were effective for facilitating conventional metaphors,
and simile-primes with mappings were effective for facilitating no-
vel metaphors initially and for facilitating conventional metaphors
at a later stage of processing. We conclude that mapping is better
characterized as a process in which comparison plays a critical role,
and that conventionality modulates the ease of this processing.Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2013.09.
010.
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